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THE DOUBLE MAJORITY VOTING RULE OF THE EU REFORM TREATY AS A 
DEMOCRATIC IDEAL FOR AN ENLARGING UNION: AN APPRAISAL USING 
VOTING POWER ANALYSIS 
The Reform Treaty agreed in Rome in September 2004 contains fundamental 
reforms to the voting system used by the Council of Ministers. The current triple-majority 
system would be replaced with a double-majority decision rule that is said to be simpler 
to understand, more democratic and more flexible. In this paper we investigate these 
claims using voting power analysis in a number of enlargement scenarios. 
 
1. QUALIFIED MAJORITY VOTING AND FUTURE EU ENLARGEMENT 
 
The council of ministers, the senior legislature of the EU, is an intergovernmental 
body in which some matters are decided by unanimity but the most important voting rule 
is qualified majority voting (QMV), that is being used for an increasing number of 
decisions. Under QMV each country has a different number of votes that it can cast that 
is related in some way to its size. Under the Reform Treaty proposals they will be strictly 
proportional to population sizes but under the system determined by the Nice Treaty and 
under the previous system the voting weights were not directly based on populations in a 
transparently mathematical way.  
The problem of the determination of the voting weights is an important one 
because under the rules of the council each country must cast its votes as a bloc; a 
country is not permitted to divide its votes for any reason, as it might, for example in 
order to reflect a division of public opinion at home in the country. Alternatively if, 
instead of a single representative with many votes, the country’s representation were by 
numbers of elected individuals who would vote individually as representatives or 
delegates rather than as a national group acting en bloc, as for example members of the 
European Parliament are able to do, the problem addressed in this paper would not exist. 
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In that case the voting power of the citizen of each country would be approximately the 
same. However in a body that uses weighted voting, there is not a simple relation 
between weight and voting power and each case must be considered on its merits by 
considering the possible outcomes of the voting process, making a voting power analysis. 
The proposed new Double Majority rule is that a decision taken by QMV should 
require the support of 55 percent of the member countries whose combined populations 
are at least 65 percent of the EU total. This contrasts with the system currently in use (the 
Nice system) under which each country has a given number of weighted votes, all of 
which were laid down in the Nice Treaty. Specifically the Nice system is a triple-majority 
rule that works as follows. For a vote to lead to a decision, three requirements must be 
met:  (i) the countries voting in favour must constitute a majority of members;  (ii) they 
must contain at least 62 percent of the population of the union; and (iii) their combined 
weighted votes must exceed the specified threshold. The Nice Treaty specified a 
threshold that depended on the size of the membership: for the union of 15 countries it 
was about 71 percent of the total of the weighted votes, increasing gradually with 
enlargement to its present level, with 27 members, to almost 74 percent. 
Studies using voting power analysis have concluded that the Nice system is 
broadly equitable in the sense that the resulting powers of individual countries are fair in 
relative terms (in an appropriately defined sense), with one or two exceptionsi, but that 
the threshold was set much too high for the Council to be able to deal with a greater range 
of decisions by qualified majority voting in an efficient manner. (Leech (2002), 
Felsenthal and Machover (2001)) 
Advocates of changing to the Double Majority rule argue, first, that it would be 
much simpler to understand than the Nice system (which has been described as 
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‘fiendishly complex’) which is lacking in transparency because of its use of artificially 
constructed voting weights. The Nice weights are criticised because they are not, even 
approximately, directly proportional to populations; the countries with larger populations 
are assigned larger weights than the smaller ones but the difference does not fully reflect 
relative populations. Superficially it appears that larger states are underrepresented, 
although it can be argued that such weights may well, in actual fact, be consistent with a 
reasonable degree of fairness in the distribution of voting power.  But this argument by 
itself would not be decisive in favour of change given that the Nice system is already in 
place.  
A second criticism of the Nice system is that the threshold is set too high, and 
moreover, increasing it as the membership increases, makes decisions harder by requiring 
a larger qualified majority, or making it easier for a blocking minority to form. Studies of 
the formal a priori decisiveness of the system have shown that the probability of a 
qualified majority emerging could be extremely small. (Felsenthal and Machover, 2001.) 
However, despite these fears, recent studies have found little evidence in practice of the 
sclerosis that was feared, and qualified majority voting appears to be working quite well. 
(Wallace and Hayes-Renshaw, 2006) 
The third argument for change is that the Nice system was designed for certain 
specified anticipated enlargements of the union, which have now all occurred. It provided 
for a union of up to 27 members - the fifteen members at the time of the treaty, plus the 
ten countries that acceded in May 2004 followed by Bulgaria and Romania that joined in 
January 2007 – and further enlargement beyond that is therefore outside its scope. The 
formal position is that the accession of a new country would require a new treaty that 
included amendments to the system of qualified majority voting. But there are further 
candidates including Turkey and the former republics of Yugoslavia; and there is also the 
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remote possibility of further FSU countries, and perhaps also other European countries 
joining. It would clearly be impossibly inefficient to have to hold an Intergovernmental 
Conference every time further enlargement took place. So there is need for a system that 
embodies a principle that can be applied in a more or less routine manner each time a 
new member accedes. An example of such a voting system is the double-majority rule in 
the Reform Treaty.  
It is this administrative simplicity that makes the double-majority voting rule most 
attractive. It enables us to know immediately how many votes a new member will have 
and in what ways the operation of qualified majority voting will be affected. All that it is  
necessary to know is the country’s population. 
2. APPRAISAL OF VOTING RULES BY POWER ANALYSIS  
It does not follow that we understand all the consequences of enlargement for the 
fairness and efficiency of the voting system. It has been claimed that a weighted voting 
rule based directly on populations will implement a desirable democratic principle of 
equality: that each country will have a voting power proportional to its population. That 
is undoubtedly a major factor in the thinking behind the proposal. However it is a serious 
mistake because in a weighted voting body like the council, where members cast all their 
votes as a single bloc, power in the sense of the ability to influence decisions is not 
related straightforwardly to weight. It is possible for example for a country to have voting 
weight that is not translated into actual voting powerii. It is therefore necessary to make a 
voting power analysis to establish the properties of this system, and in particular the 
powers of the members. 
In this paper we do this by considering voting in the Council of Ministers as a 
formal two-stage democratic decision process that allows us to compare voting power of 
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citizens of different countries. It is a fundamental principle of the EU that all citizens 
should have equal rights in whatever country they happen to live. This provides a natural 
criterion on which to judge the adequacy of the voting system, a benchmark against 
which to compare the fairness of the distribution of voting power. We use voting power 
analysis to do this, following the approach of Penrose (1946, 1952), treating the council 
of ministers as a delegate body on which individual citizens are represented by 
government ministers elected by them.  
The voting power of a citizen is derived from two components: (i) power of his or 
her country in the council (a property of the system of weighted QMV in the council), 
and (ii) the power of the citizen in a popular election within the country. A citizen’s 
voting power, as a structural property of the voting system, is measured by his or her 
Penrose power index, which is the product of these two voting power indices. 
We make two analyses. First we compare the double-majority rule with the Nice 
system for the current EU of 27 countries. Secondly we investigate various scenarios for 
further enlargement. These begin with the expected accession of the known candidate 
countries and then become more and more speculative as further new members are 
presupposed. Our primary purpose is to test the claim that the Reform Treaty proposals 
are simple and transparent in the face of further enlargementiii. We also investigate the 
alternative voting rule that has recently been proposed, known as the Jagiellonian 
Compromise, and find it remarkably equitable. (Slomczynski and Zyczkowski, 2007) 
We report analyses of the following Scenarios for possible future enlargement of 
the EUiv: 
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O EU27: the current union. Member countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, United Kingdom.  
I EU29: as above plus Croatia, Macedonia. 
II EU30: with Turkey. 
III EU34: with Albania, Bosnia, Montenegro, Serbia. 
IV EU37: with Norway, Iceland, Switzerland. 
V EU40: with Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine. 
VI EU41: with Russia. 
In the next section we describe the mathematics of the voting power approach that 
we employ to analyse these scenarios. 
3.  THE PENROSE POWER INDEX APPROACH 
The EU council of ministers at any time is assumed to consist of n member 
countries, represented by a set N={1,2,. . . , n}, where each country is labelled by an 
integer  i = 1 to n . Each country has a population (which we take, as a first 
approximation, to be the same as its electoratev), represented for country i by mi . The 
total population of the EU is m =  m jj ∈N∑ .  
Under the Reform Treaty, any normal decision requires a double majority in 
favour of the proposal: at least 55% of member countries whose combined populations 
are at least 65% of the total population. 
Suppose that in any vote concerning such a decision there are s countries in 
favour, represented by a set S,  a subset of N. Then the decision is taken if:  
(i) s > 0.55n ;         and            (ii) mjj∈S∑ ≥ 0.65m      (1.) 
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Let us denote the number of such subsets that satisfy conditions (1) by ω; that is, 
ω is the number of possible outcomes of votes among the countries in the council of 
ministers that lead to a decision. The number ω reflects the general capacity of the body 
to act (a measure of its decisiveness). 
The appropriate measure of a priori voting power for each country can now be 
defined in terms of its ability to influence decisions taken by this rule, strictly by its being 
able to swing a decision by adding its vote to those of the other members. A swing is 
defined for member i as a subset S which does not contain i such that: it is just losing and 
becomes winning with the addition of member i. Formally, the two conditions for a swing 
are, 
 
(i)    0.55n − 1 ≤ s < 0.55n,                   and
(ii)   0.65m − mi  ≤ mj
j∈S
∑  < 0.65m  ,  for any S ⊆ N , i ∉S.
  (2.) 
The number of possible swings, S, taking account of all possible voting outcomes 
among the n-1 members other than i, that is the number of subsets of  N\{i}, is 2n-1. If the 
number of swings for country i is denoted by hi, then the (modifiedvi) Penrose index for 
the council of ministers is defined as Pi
C  
 Pi
C  =  ηi
2n−1
 ,                for  i =1,2,...,n.    (3.) 
The basic interpretation of expression (3) is the proportion of all possible voting 
outcomes that are swings for country i. It is usually given a probabilistic interpretation by 
assuming that all possible voting outcomes are equally likely.  
Computation of the indices PiC is a substantial problem especially when the 
number of countries is large because the direct evaluation of expression (3.) requires a 
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search over all 2n possible voting outcomes. Such a computation becomes prohibitively 
slow even when n is relatively small and therefore alternative approaches have to be 
found. The method used in this study is a modification of the method of generating 
functions first defined by Brams and Affuso (1976)  and extended to multiple decision 
rules by Algaba et al (2003). The method of generating functions is very fast even for 
very large voting bodies and therefore is suitable to the present analysis of a union with 
an expanding membership. This great speed comes at a cost however in terms of space 
complexity which limits the sizes of the weights that the method of generating functions 
can cope with. The method of generating functions is described and full details of 
computation are given in Aziz et al. (2007). 
The Penrose index (3) is a measure of absolute voting power in the sense of 
meaning the country’s likelihood of being decisive when all voting outcomes are 
considered on an equal basis. A measure of the decisiveness of the Council, its Power to 
Act, AC, is a measure of its ability to make decisions defined on the same basis. The 
power to act is the number of subsets of all n countries that would lead to a decision 
(Coleman, 1971): 
                    AC  =   ω
2n
 .  (4.) 
The power of an individual citizen is defined formally by idealising the council as 
a representative body in which the determination of how a country will cast its weighted 
votes follows a simple majority vote among its citizens. This requires finding a measure 
of the power of a single citizen within the country. 
The Penrose power index of a citizen assuming a one-person-one-vote electoral 
systemvii is the likelihood of his or her being able to swing the national election. This is 
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the binomial probability of his or her being the swing voter, considering all possible 
voting outcomes among the other voters to be equally likely. For country i, with mi 
voters, it is the probability that the number of votes cast by the mi-1 voters other than the 
single citizen under consideration are precisely one vote short of a majorityviii. Denote 
this power index for the single vote of any citizen in country i by Pi
S .  
Then, if mi is even, 
Pi
S  = Pr [combined votes of mi-1 voters = 
mi
2
]   =   
mi −1
mi
2
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ (0.5)
mi −1 (5.) 
or, if mi is odd, 
Pi
S  = Pr [combined votes of mi-1 voters = 
mi −1
2
]   =   
mi −1
mi −1
2
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ (0.5)
mi −1 (6.) 
When mi is large, as is well known, (5) and (6) can be approximated very accurately by 
Stirling’s formulaix, which gives Pi
S  a very simple form, 
Pi
S    =   2πmi   =    
0.79788
mi
 (7.) 
We can evaluate the indirect power index for a citizen of country i as the product 
of (7.) and (3.). Let us denote this composed power index Pi. Therefore we can write, for 
the indirect power of a citizen of country i,  
Pi    =    Pi
C Pi
S  (8.) 
The numerical value of Pi is of course rather small because Pi
S  is small. However 
its value can vary enormously between countries, over changes in the membership of the 
union and changes in the voting system. Expression (8) provides a yardstick or 
benchmark to use in the evaluation of the weighted voting system on a consistent basis of 
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democratic legitimacy. Comparisons can be made using relative voting power indices to 
compare countries and therefore to test the extent to which the voting system is 
egalitarian.  
Expression (8.) can be used as the basis of the Penrose Square Root rule for 
equalising voting power in all countries. The rule is that weighted voting be adopted in 
the council with a decision rule and weights chosen such that (8.) is constant for all i. The 
power indices PiC therefore should be proportional to the square roots of the populations. 
This can be a decision rule with a single majority. An approximation to this that will be 
sufficient in many cases is to choose the weights themselves in proportion to population 
square roots. This has been applied recently in the so-called Jagiellonian compromise in 
which also the decision threshold is also adjusted to improve the approximation 
(Slomczynski and Zyczkowski, 2007). We have investigated the performance of this 
proposed voting rule in equality of voting power and find it works very well indeed. 
4. ANALYSIS: VOTING POWER IN THE EU27 
We compared the three voting systems for the present-day union, E27. The results 
are given in Table 1x in which the countries are in size order. The Penrose indices agree 
very closely with those of Felsenthal and Machover (2007), the only slight differences 
being due to the use of different weights.  
The method of generating functions requires that the weights be integers that are 
not too large. This necessitates, in practice, replacing the population figures, which are 
mostly millions and too large numbers to be used as weights, by much smaller integers 
that are manageable computationallyxi. The table also gives the quota in terms of the 
weights. 
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Besides the Penrose index for each country, PiC ,  Table 1 also shows the indirect 
citizen power indices, Pi , defined in (8.). These are presented in two ways, as absolute 
values and relative to the power of a citizen of Germany. (In all our results the relative 
voting power of a German citizen is taken as equal to 1.) The absolute citizen voting 
power indices are of course very small in all countries. Under the Reform treaty, that for 
Germany is equal to 1.76x10-5 , that is 0.0000176 , while that for the smallest member, 
Malta, is 3.41x10-5.  
The relative voting power indices show the inequity inherent in the voting rule, 
with all but those for the smallest group of countries being less than 1. The effect is 
biggest for the medium sized countries, especially Belgium, with 0.673, and Greece, 
0.671. The conclusion is that the Double Majority system would create large disparities 
in voting power in different countries.  
Inequality is measured by the Gini coefficient of citizen voting power for the 
whole unionxii.  Table 1 shows how much more unequal the proposed voting system 
would be compared with the existing Nice system, under which citizens of every country 
(with the slight exception of Latvia) have slightly greater voting power than those of 
Germany (a result due to the fact that Germany has no greater weight than France, Italy 
and the UK despite its much larger population): the Gini coefficient for Nice being 0.059, 
that for the Reform Treaty, 0.080.  
We have also reported the power to act of the council of ministers, AC , which 
show that the Reform Treaty voting rule is a very much more decisive voting rule than 
Nicexiii, with a power to act of 0.129 compared to a very low value of 0.02. 
The results for the Jagiellonian Compromise are quite impressive in showing that 
this method would lead to the equalisation of voting power throughout the union of 27 
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countriesxiv. There is almost no variation in the relative citizen voting power indices 
across countries, which indicates how good an approximation to the Penrose square root 
rule is obtained by using population square roots as weights. 
 
 
5. ANALYSIS: ENLARGEMENT SCENARIOS 
Table 2 presents the results for the enlargement scenarios I to VI. They are 
presented diagrammatically for existing members in Figures 1 to 3.  We also present a 
parallel analysis for the Jagiellonian Compromise in Table 3. In all scenarios the same 
population figures have been used, the 2006 estimates taken from Eurostatxv.  
They show that the inequality in citizen voting power under the Double Majority 
rule persists although there are sharp changes in relative voting power following changes 
Country Population Penrose Czn Rel Czn Penrose Czn Rel Czn Weight Penrose Czn Rel Czn
Index Power Power Weight Index Power Power Index Power Power
Germany 82,437,995 0.03269 2.87E-06 1.000 824 0.20011 1.76E-05 1.000 9080 0.20080 1.76E-05 1.00000
France 62,998,773 0.03269 3.29E-06 1.144 630 0.15517 1.56E-05 0.887 7937 0.17597 1.77E-05 1.00246
UK 60,393,100 0.03269 3.36E-06 1.168 604 0.14932 1.53E-05 0.872 7771 0.17233 1.77E-05 1.00267
Italy 58,751,711 0.03269 3.40E-06 1.185 588 0.14587 1.52E-05 0.863 7665 0.16999 1.77E-05 1.00276
Spain 43,758,250 0.03116 3.76E-06 1.308 438 0.11252 1.36E-05 0.772 6615 0.14675 1.77E-05 1.00310
Poland 38,157,055 0.03116 4.02E-06 1.401 382 0.09816 1.27E-05 0.721 6177 0.13702 1.77E-05 1.00300
Romania 21,610,213 0.01789 3.07E-06 1.069 216 0.07139 1.23E-05 0.697 4649 0.10307 1.77E-05 1.00256
Netherlands 16,334,210 0.01669 3.29E-06 1.147 163 0.06006 1.19E-05 0.674 4042 0.08959 1.77E-05 1.00230
Greece 11,125,179 0.01547 3.70E-06 1.288 111 0.04933 1.18E-05 0.671 3335 0.07390 1.77E-05 1.00182
Portugal 10,569,592 0.01547 3.80E-06 1.322 106 0.04830 1.19E-05 0.674 3251 0.07203 1.77E-05 1.00184
Belgium 10,511,382 0.01547 3.81E-06 1.325 105 0.04810 1.18E-05 0.673 3242 0.07184 1.77E-05 1.00184
Czech 10,251,079 0.01547 3.86E-06 1.342 103 0.04768 1.19E-05 0.676 3202 0.07095 1.77E-05 1.00191
Hungary 10,076,581 0.01547 3.89E-06 1.354 101 0.04727 1.19E-05 0.676 3174 0.07031 1.77E-05 1.00156
Sweden 9,047,752 0.01299 3.45E-06 1.199 90 0.04500 1.19E-05 0.679 3008 0.06664 1.77E-05 1.00180
Austria 8,265,925 0.01299 3.60E-06 1.255 83 0.04356 1.21E-05 0.687 2875 0.06369 1.77E-05 1.00168
Bulgaria 7,718,750 0.01299 3.73E-06 1.299 77 0.04233 1.22E-05 0.691 2778 0.06154 1.77E-05 1.00149
Denmark 5,427,459 0.00916 3.14E-06 1.092 54 0.03758 1.29E-05 0.732 2330 0.05161 1.77E-05 1.00164
Slovakia 5,389,180 0.00916 3.15E-06 1.096 54 0.03758 1.29E-05 0.735 2321 0.05141 1.77E-05 1.00131
Finland 5,255,580 0.00916 3.19E-06 1.110 53 0.03738 1.30E-05 0.740 2293 0.05078 1.77E-05 1.00161
Ireland 4,209,019 0.00916 3.56E-06 1.240 42 0.03510 1.37E-05 0.776 2052 0.04544 1.77E-05 1.00145
Lithuania 3,403,284 0.00916 3.96E-06 1.379 34 0.03344 1.45E-05 0.822 1845 0.04086 1.77E-05 1.00143
Latvia 2,294,590 0.00525 2.77E-06 0.963 23 0.03116 1.64E-05 0.933 1515 0.03355 1.77E-05 1.00142
Slovenia 2,003,358 0.00525 2.96E-06 1.030 20 0.03053 1.72E-05 0.979 1415 0.03133 1.77E-05 1.00070
Estonia 1,344,684 0.00525 3.61E-06 1.257 13 0.02908 2.00E-05 1.138 1160 0.02568 1.77E-05 1.00148
Cyprus 766,414 0.00525 4.78E-06 1.666 8 0.02803 2.56E-05 1.453 875 0.01938 1.77E-05 1.00069
Luxembourg 459,500 0.00525 6.18E-06 2.151 5 0.02741 3.23E-05 1.835 678 0.01501 1.77E-05 1.00149
Malta 404,346 0.00396 4.97E-06 1.730 4 0.02720 3.41E-05 1.941 636 0.01408 1.77E-05 1.00126
Total 492,964,961 0.41999 4930 1.71869 95921 2.12556
Quota 3205 59062
Power to Act 0.020 0.129 0.163
Gini Coeff 0.059 0.080 9.08E-05
Czn Power: Citizen Power Pi 
Nice
Table 1: Voting Power Analysis of the EU27
Reform Treaty Jagiellonian
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in the membership. On the other hand, the Jagiellonian system turns out to be remarkably 
successful in creating a very equal distribution of citizen power in all scenarios, and to be 
quite robust to membership changes. The use of square root weights and adjustment of 
the quota gives an extremely good approximation to the Penrose square root rule. 
The results for the Reform Treaty voting rule in Table 2 show that citizen voting 
power is relatively unequal under all scenarios. The Gini coefficient for Scenario VI (41 
countries including Russia) is the same as in Scenario O (EU27) although it falls below 
this in some scenarios. Citizen voting power is most equal following the accession of 
Turkey, Gini = 0.059, Scenario II, that may be largely due to the similarity in population 
of the two largest members, Germany and Turkey. Whereas having one country that is 
much larger than all the others creates an unequal power distribution, where there are two 
members with very large weight, a bipolar voting structure, there is a tendency for them 
to counteract one another. Thus the presence of Turkey would reduce Germany’s power 
and increase the power of other members, making the distribution more equal. The 
accession of Turkey would substantially increase the voting power of citizens of Poland 
and Spain, from 0.718 and 0.772 to 0.822 and 0.815. There is a similar effect for medium 
sized countries, but their relative voting power remains much lower: for example, the 
index for Belgium goes from 0.661 to 0.760. The effects for small countries, whose 
citizen voting powers are already much larger than Germany’s are quite large: for 
example, Malta’s goes from 1.859 to 2.442. 
The power of the council to act, AC, declines more or less steadily as the union 
enlarges, from 12.9% for O (EU27) to 9.3% in VI, although it is always much greater 
than under the current system. 
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Our overall conclusion is that the Reform Treaty’s Double Majority rule falls a 
long way short of the democratic ideal of ensuring that the votes of all members of the 
community are of equal value whatever country they are cast in. It is an endemic feature 
that citizens of middle sized countries have considerably less voting power than those in 
either large or small countries. This pattern persists under all the enlargement scenarios 
we have looked at. 
Country O I II III IV V VI
Albania 0.933 1.030 0.818 1.231
Austria 0.687 0.673 0.788 0.743 0.800 0.679 0.917
Belarus 0.670 0.886
Belgium 0.673 0.661 0.760 0.721 0.770 0.667 0.871
Bosnia & H 0.872 0.960 0.771 1.139
Bulgaria 0.691 0.676 0.796 0.749 0.808 0.682 0.931
Croatia 0.000 0.742 0.906 0.841 0.921 0.748 1.087
Cyprus 1.453 1.394 1.815 1.648 1.854 1.404 2.276
Czech 0.676 0.663 0.764 0.725 0.774 0.669 0.877
Denmark 0.732 0.712 0.861 0.802 0.875 0.718 1.025
Estonia 1.138 1.094 1.409 1.284 1.439 1.102 1.756
Finland 0.740 0.719 0.871 0.811 0.885 0.726 1.038
France 0.887 0.889 0.904 0.900 0.905 0.909 0.921
Germany 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Greece 0.671 0.659 0.755 0.718 0.765 0.665 0.862
Hungary 0.676 0.663 0.765 0.725 0.775 0.669 0.879
Iceland 2.876 2.152 3.554
Ireland 0.776 0.753 0.925 0.857 0.941 0.759 1.114
Italy 0.863 0.865 0.884 0.880 0.886 0.888 0.906
Latvia 0.933 0.900 1.139 1.044 1.161 0.907 1.401
Lithuania 0.822 0.796 0.989 0.913 1.007 0.803 1.201
Luxembourg 1.835 1.758 2.304 2.087 2.355 1.770 2.902
Macedonia 0.935 1.189 1.089 1.213 0.942 1.468
Malta 1.941 1.859 2.442 2.210 2.496 1.872 3.080
Moldova 0.780 1.156
Montenegro 1.842 2.076 1.564 2.555
Netherlands 0.674 0.666 0.739 0.711 0.746 0.671 0.822
Norway 0.911 0.741 1.074
Poland 0.721 0.718 0.822 0.804 0.817 0.788 0.846
Portugal 0.674 0.662 0.761 0.722 0.771 0.668 0.872
Romania 0.697 0.692 0.746 0.724 0.752 0.692 0.812
Russia 1.225
Serbia 0.727 0.778 0.670 0.883
Slovakia 0.735 0.715 0.864 0.805 0.878 0.721 1.029
Slovenia 0.979 0.943 1.200 1.098 1.224 0.951 1.481
Spain 0.772 0.772 0.815 0.802 0.814 0.815 0.854
Sweden 0.679 0.665 0.774 0.732 0.785 0.671 0.897
Switzerland 0.814 0.686 0.939
Turkey 0.959 0.958 0.959 0.968 0.969
UK 0.872 0.874 0.892 0.888 0.893 0.896 0.911
Ukraine 0.825 0.861
Power to Act 0.129 0.126 0.110 0.106 0.092 0.096 0.093
Gini Coefficient 0.080 0.082 0.059 0.067 0.061 0.079 0.080
Weights used are given in Table 1. Gini coefficients computed at the citizen level for the whole union.
Enlargement Scenarios
Table 2: Citizen Indirect Power Indices Under All Scenarios: Reform Treaty
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Table 3 shows the results for the Jagiellonian compromise under the same 
scenarios. For each scenario the weights, which are the population square roots, √mi ,  are 
shown in the first column, and the quota is equal to: 
 q = 1
2
m + mi
i=1
n∑⎡⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥  
O I II III IV V VI
Country Weight EU27 EU29 EU30 EU34 EU37 EU40 EU41
Albania 1786 1.0004 1.0005 1.0005 0.9987
Austria 2875 1.0017 1.0017 1.0006 1.0007 1.0008 1.0007 0.9989
Belarus 3113 1.0009 0.9991
Belgium 3242 1.0018 1.0019 1.0007 1.0008 1.0009 1.0008 0.9990
Bosnia & H 1984 1.0007 1.0007 1.0007 0.9990
Bulgaria 2778 1.0015 1.0016 1.0004 1.0006 1.0007 1.0006 0.9988
Croatia 2134 1.0014 1.0003 1.0004 1.0005 1.0005 0.9987
Cyprus 875 1.0007 1.0007 0.9996 0.9998 0.9999 0.9999 0.9981
Czech 3202 1.0019 1.0020 1.0008 1.0009 1.0010 1.0009 0.9991
Denmark 2330 1.0016 1.0017 1.0006 1.0007 1.0008 1.0008 0.9990
Estonia 1160 1.0015 1.0017 1.0004 1.0007 1.0008 1.0008 0.9990
Finland 2293 1.0016 1.0018 1.0007 1.0008 1.0009 1.0008 0.9991
France 7937 1.0025 1.0025 1.0015 1.0014 1.0014 1.0011 1.0001
Germany 9080 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Greece 3335 1.0018 1.0018 1.0006 1.0007 1.0008 1.0007 0.9989
Hungary 3174 1.0016 1.0018 1.0006 1.0007 1.0008 1.0007 0.9989
Iceland 549 1.0011 1.0011 0.9993
Ireland 2052 1.0015 1.0017 1.0006 1.0007 1.0008 1.0008 0.9990
Italy 7665 1.0028 1.0028 1.0016 1.0016 1.0015 1.0013 1.0002
Latvia 1515 1.0014 1.0015 1.0004 1.0006 1.0006 1.0006 0.9989
Lithaunia 1845 1.0014 1.0016 1.0004 1.0006 1.0006 1.0006 0.9989
Luxembourg 678 1.0015 1.0013 1.0011 1.0005 1.0006 1.0006 0.9988
Macedonia 1428 1.0014 1.0006 1.0007 1.0008 1.0008 0.9990
Malta 636 1.0013 1.0013 1.0011 1.0005 1.0005 1.0006 0.9989
Moldova 1948 1.0006 0.9989
Montenegro 773 0.9999 1.0000 1.0000 0.9982
Netherlands 4042 1.0023 1.0024 1.0012 1.0012 1.0012 1.0011 0.9994
Norway 2167 1.0004 1.0004 0.9986
Poland 6177 1.0030 1.0030 1.0017 1.0017 1.0017 1.0014 0.9999
Portugal 3251 1.0018 1.0019 1.0007 1.0008 1.0009 1.0008 0.9990
Romania 4649 1.0026 1.0027 1.0013 1.0014 1.0014 1.0012 0.9995
Russia 11937 0.9943
Serbia 3140 1.0009 1.0010 1.0009 0.9991
Slovakia 2321 1.0013 1.0014 1.0003 1.0004 1.0005 1.0004 0.9986
Slovenia 1415 1.0007 1.0011 1.0000 1.0001 1.0002 1.0002 0.9984
Spain 6615 1.0031 1.0031 1.0018 1.0018 1.0018 1.0015 1.0000
Sweden 3008 1.0018 1.0018 1.0007 1.0008 1.0009 1.0008 0.9990
Switzerland 2736 1.0009 1.0008 0.9990
Turkey 8653 1.0007 1.0007 1.0007 1.0005 1.0001
UK 7771 1.0027 1.0026 1.0015 1.0015 1.0014 1.0012 1.0001
Ukraine 6797 1.0014 1.0000
Total 95921 99483 108136 115,819 121271 133129 145066
Quota: 59062 60917 66052 70076 72929 79451 86735
Power indices computed using program ipgenf from website, Leech and Leech (2004).
Table 3: Citizen Indirect Power Indices Under All Scenarios: Jagiellonian Compromise
Enlargement Scenarios
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There is almost no variation in the relative citizen voting powers either between 
countries or over scenarios. We conclude that the method is therefore found to be 
extremely successful in equalising voting power in a wide range of circumstances. 
 
Figure 1 Relative Citizen Power: Large Countries
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Figure 2: Relative Citizen Voting Power: Middle-sized Countries
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Figure 3 Relative Citizen Voting Power: Small Countries
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
We have tested the suitability of the proposed Double Majority rule in the EU 
Reform Treaty by looking at its implications for voting power under various enlargement 
scenarios, some of which are realistic prospects, while some are no more than 
speculations. Our scenarios include the possibility of virtually all European countries up 
to and even including Russia, acceding to membership. We have also tested the 
performance of the Jagiellonian compromise based on the Penrose Square Root rule 
whereby voting weights are determined by a simple formula as proportional to population 
square roots. In judging the voting rule we looked at two criteria:  (i) equality of voting 
power as measured by the Penrose power index at the level of the citizen, assuming one-
person-one-vote in national elections, and (ii) decisiveness of the Council of Ministers, as 
measured by the Coleman power to act. 
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We found that for the present union of 27, the Reform Treaty voting rule gives a 
much more unequal distribution of citizen voting power than the existing voting rule, 
although it leads to the Council of Ministers being more decisive. The Jagiellonian 
compromise leads to the equalisation of citizen voting power in all countries. 
In considering enlargement scenarios, the inequality of citizen voting power 
persists with each enlargement. The common pattern is for citizens of the smallest 
countries to have the greatest voting power, sometimes by a factor of as much as 2 or 3 
times those of other countries, such as in the cases of Malta and Luxembourg. The 
medium sized countries have the smallest citizen voting power. That for Netherlands, for 
example, varies from about two-thirds that of Germany in EU27 to about four fifths of it 
following the accession of Russia. 
Our conclusion is that the Reform Treaty voting system is a flawed proposal that 
fails to reach the democratic ideal of equality of voting power of all citizens in the 
European Union. This ideal is reached by the Jagiellonian Compromise. 
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i Germany was deliberately underrepresented relative to its population and it turned out that Spain and 
Poland were overrepresented. 
ii Luxembourg in the original EEC of six members is a case in point. It had one vote while France, West 
Germany and Italy each had 4, Netherlands and Belgium 2 each. Luxembourg did not have one quarter the 
voting power of France, as these figures suggest, but precisely zero because the decision threshold was set 
at 12, and therefore in order that its vote could make a difference, the combined votes of the others would 
have to come to 11, which was impossible. See Leech (2003). 
iii Obviously, since the analysis is theoretical, we could have done this using hypothetical countries with 
assumed or randomly generated populations; but it is of considerable intrinsic interest to use real countries. 
iv We do not include any microstates with populations under 100,000 such as Lichtenstein, Andorra, 
Monaco or San Marino in any future enlargements. 
v We also assume this to be the number of electors who participate in elections.  We make no allowance for 
possible variations in voter turnout.  
vi The index is modified because we are considering a double-majority rule rather than the conventional 
single rule. The difference is conceptually trivial although important computationally. 
vii What Penrose called the power of a single vote. For simplicity this is modelled as a stylised plebiscite. 
More complex arrangements corresponding more closely to real world electoral systems await further 
research. 
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viii We disregard the possibility of a tie to save space. It does not affect the analysis when mi is large and 
(7.) still holds. 
ixPenrose (1946) p.53, (1952) p.11. See also for example Feller (1968) pp 50-3. 
xA spreadsheet containing the detailed calculations is available from the authors. The power indices for the 
Nice system have previously been published in Leech (2002) and Felsenthal and Machover (2001). Indices 
for the Double-Majority rule and Jagiellonian compromise have been published by Felsenthal and 
Machover (2007).  
xi For the case of EU27 we have also done these computations using direct enumeration, that is by 
searching over all voting outcomes and using expression (3.) directly, which does not require us to use this 
fudge, and the results are the same to a very close approximation. This exact method was not available to 
use for the larger enlargement scenarios of course and therefore we have used generating functions 
throughout. 
xii The Gini coefficients have been calculated by treating all citizens from all countries as a single group.  
xiii The powers to act have been reported in Felsenthal and Machover (2007). 
xiv We found that we could compute these power indices to full accuracy using weights that are the square 
roots of the populations without adjustment. 
xv It would be an interesting analysis to allow for future population growth. That would suggest important 
new scenarios which did not necessarily involve new members. 
